Interview with Hugh Segal: Commonwealth Oral History Project by Onslow, Sue et al.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOICE FILE NAME: COHP Hugh Segal (Part One) 
 
 
Key: 
SO: Dr Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 
HS: Senator Hugh Segal (Respondent) 
 
 
Part One:  
 
SO:  This is Sue Onslow talking to Senator Hugh Segal at the Royal 
Commonwealth Society in London on Wednesday, 13th March 2013. 
Senator Segal, thank you very much indeed for agreeing to talk to me. I 
wondered if you could begin by saying, in a general way, what has 
informed your views towards the Commonwealth in your political 
career. 
 
HS: I'd say probably two things. When I was very young, Her Majesty came to my 
part of Montreal to open the St Lawrence Seaway. I would have been eight 
years old. It was 1959, Her Majesty was a young queen – I would say about 
thirty-three or thirty-two – and she looked very radiant. She came to speak in 
our small town hall in the northwest part of the city, and when someone – my 
father – explained to me who she was, what she did, what the 
Commonwealth was, that she was the head of the Church of England and 
that this was about everybody being equal under the Crown, that began my 
interest in what this sort of highly external force might mean in the life of an 
immigrant kid like myself, number one. Then, the politics really came from my 
association with the Conservative party. I joined the Conservative party when 
John Diefenbaker was Prime Minister, so we're looking at 1963. I was 
thirteen, and my daughter now would say, "Dad, that's the nerdiest thing I've 
ever heard about you." 
 
SO: I'm sorry, but I agree with your daughter! 
 
HS: I agree! But I did that because Diefenbaker was very much a politician who 
was focused on – as many Conservative politicians are – what are our roots, 
what are our binding histories, what is the nature of our country. He had been 
a leader, for example, in the early battles to find a solution to how countries 
that were not realms of the Monarch could still be part of the Commonwealth, 
with Her Majesty as the head of the Commonwealth, and with them having 
their own heads of state. He brought in the first Canadian Bill of Rights. So, 
the whole notion of equality under the Crown, the notion of a pluralist frame of 
reference which reflected the best of Canada [and] the best of some of our 
University  of  London 
INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES 
2 
 
international relationships, very much became associated with the 
Commonwealth in my mind. 
 
As a young person, I was quite the Canadian nationalist. So, anything that 
was an association that didn't involve the Americans or wasn't an association 
that the Americans dominated was just – in a very simplistic way – very 
attractive to me. And, of course, the Commonwealth was one of those places 
where, while the dominant power was Great Britain in those days, the truth of 
the matter is [that] Canada was a relatively significant player. We were the 
number two donor; we were one of the original signatories. So, if you're a 
nationalist, then the Commonwealth is much more attractive to you, for 
example, than the Organisation of American States, where everybody is a bit 
player by comparison to the United States. So, in the early days, that's what 
attracted me to the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Senator Segal, your emphasis is very much on the identity of the 
Canadian nation with the Commonwealth because it has a pluralist 
society, a federal structure and it was a case of differentiating yourself 
from America. The Commonwealth offered, then, a forum in which 
Canada – as a united group – could play that much larger role. 
 
HS: Yes. And Sue, I'll give you an experience, if I may – I feel as if I'm imposing 
on you, but…In Grade Four, I'm sitting in my class in a small religious school 
in Montreal – a Jewish religious school. The wall was festooned with sketches 
of all the prophets and Moses and Abraham and Jacob and all the rest, and 
there, at the front of the class, on top of it all, is a picture of a very young 
Queen and Prince Philip. I remember asking my teacher what the picture of 
Her Majesty and Prince Philip would be doing with all these Biblical sketches. 
The lady's name was Mrs Handleman. She said, "Hugh, it's because we are 
all equal under the Crown that we're allowed to have religious schools in this 
country. We are all treated equally under the law. That is the British tradition. 
Without that, we might not have the freedom to worship and attend schools in 
our own religious denomination." When you're very young, that has a huge 
impact on understanding the structure of the world. Then, of course, your 
commitment becomes as substantive as it is emotional. 
 
SO: And that's of particular importance. You made reference to your family's 
immigrant status. So, was it again an affirmation of individual freedom 
as well as freedom of worship? 
 
HS: Oh, absolutely, and the fact that Canada – this is before the Statute of 
Westminster – welcomed all kinds of folks from the steppes of Russia, where 
my people came from on my father's side, or from the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, where they came from on my mother's side, and they were welcomed 
into a society which said, “Come and be equal and do your part and pay your 
taxes and enjoy your rights and build.” That allowed my family, who were very 
much working class people – my grandfather on my mother's side was the 
first European baker on the streets of Montreal, and my grandfather on my 
father's side was a tailor in the needle and thread context of those words – 
they produced kids who went on to be University Presidents and the rest, and 
that's because of the kind of place Canada was. And the British 
Commonwealth influence produced, in some measure, that kind of society of 
opportunity. 
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SO: You have set out very much your personal philosophy, in attachment to 
the Commonwealth. How important is being a 'Red Tory' in identifying 
with Commonwealth values in the Canadian context? 
 
HS: Well, because a Red Tory – which you folks here [in the UK] would call a ‘wet’ 
– is very much identified with what I would call the balance between freedom 
and order…The neo-cons are about freedom, [whereas] traditional landed 
Tories might be more about order than freedom: sort of the ‘High Church’ 
Tories. But Red Tories are about the balance between order and freedom. 
Order includes things like equality of opportunity, freedom of expression, 
pluralism, rule of law and, of course, the freedom side are all the freedoms 
which we should never take for granted. The Commonwealth – as a global 
organisation which is non-military [and] non-treaty – seemed to be an 
organisation whose main mission was to try and help countries achieve the 
right balance in that context, relevant to their own culture and history. Not to 
impose – although the legislative structure and other things are very much of 
the Westminster tradition in most Commonwealth countries – but to assist 
countries through technical assistance, through Commonwealth scholarships, 
through a whole bunch of other initiatives to build their own proper balance. 
That's the balance which produces civility, and that's the balance which 
produces inoculation in terms of the two worst fears in the world. If you have 
an absence of freedom from fear or an absence of freedom from want, then 
you have the basis for societies coming apart. The Commonwealth has 
always been, in my view, about a balance between those two freedoms: 
facilitating the kind of investment, engagement and support. When I grew up, 
as a young man, our first foreign aid project in Canada of any substance 
under Mike Pearson was called the Colombo Plan. Just think about that in the 
context of where I'm headed in the next few days. The Colombo Plan was 
seen as a very serious investment to bring core infrastructure capacity to a 
part of the world that had none, and that's where Canadians stepped up. So, 
in that context, [it’s] not just the British connection [but] the Commonwealth 
has always struck me – because it doesn't have the hierarchy of a 
‘Permanent Five’, because it doesn't have any vetoes – as the place more 
likely to achieve some of that progress in constructive ways than might be the 
case elsewhere. 
 
SO: On this particular philosophical approach toward the Commonwealth 
that you've outlined here, do you identify this as being particularly 
associated with the Red Tories, or is this reflective of political and 
cultural outlooks that are common across Canadian political parties? 
 
HS: It is in the nature of how Canada emerged as an independent democracy. We 
did not have a revolution. We had a very modest revolt in the 1830s, 1840s, 
which is really less than “a whiff of grapeshot”, by any definition. We evolved 
from the King's Council, the Governor's Council, which had no democracy, to 
responsible government where our legislatures had control over spending. 
That process of evolution involved agents of the Crown. I particularly make 
reference to Lord Elgin, who was the Governor General, who signed the first 
democratically-passed bill from the legislature of Canada – with which he 
profoundly disagreed, but where he took the position that his job was to certify 
and not to approve what those elected by the voters had approved. This, by 
the way, interestingly enough, was a bill to provide reparations to French 
Canadians who had lost their homes because they'd been part of the Revolt 
of the 1830s, and the Anglos were desperately upset that these reparations 
had been passed. But the Governor, who said the British approach to 
4 
 
government involves certifying democratic decisions, stood firm. So, in that 
context, you could see in Canada's early days the British-designated 
Governor – a Tory, by the way – [serving as] the nursemaid to Canadian 
democracy without any serious shots being fired – without any serious 
revolution or civil war. So, there's something about that, which says that the 
Commonwealth message, in its present form, can be a similar constructive 
force for good. 
 
SO: In your own political career, when did Commonwealth issues start 
looming large? 
 
HS: Probably when I was in the Young Conservatives, supporting Mr Diefenbaker, 
and your government set aside the Preferential Commonwealth Tariff in 
favour of the EEC. I think that's…We're now talking about probably the late 
1960s, and Trudeau was Prime Minister. I think Ted Heath was your man 
here, if I recall properly? 
 
SO: Heath became Prime Minister in June 1970, so this was in the run up to 
us signing the Treaty of Rome and joining the European Community. 
 
HS: I remember that the [Canadian] Conservative Party's position was that Heath 
and the UK were turning their back on us – that the preferential tariff is gone 
and this will radically change our relationship with Great Britain forever. Some 
of that was sour grapes on our part, some of that was us refusing to face up 
to our own hemispheric trade responsibilities with the United States, and 
some of that was a Conservative party that could not disengage from a kind 
of British tutelage which has been part of its history. We've outgrown that now 
– and so has the Commonwealth – but that was the first time it showed up as 
a dynamic issue in the politics of our country. 
 
SO: Yes. And thereafter? 
 
HS: Trudeau was very funny in the sense that he was, in some ways, quite 
mocking of the Crown and the Commonwealth, but in other ways he was very 
innovative – suggesting things like a private gathering of Commonwealth 
leaders to retreat without staff. He was very steadfast on apartheid in a way 
that was very constructive to the coherence of the Commonwealth. So, while 
he was busy removing any symbols of the Crown from things like mailboxes 
and, of course, the new flag, which removed the Union Jack from the 
corner…That 1963-65 fight over the flag was a very intense one, because it 
was basically a fight that said Canada was now sufficiently mature that we 
could remove the Union Jack from the corner of our flag, and nobody would 
die. Of course, it was in fact the absolute right decision. I opposed it as a 
young person. I was maybe part of the twenty percent of the Canadian 
population who was in favour of the old flag, in terms of young people. The 
vast majority of people were in favour of the new flag, and history tells us they 
were right, because the new flag says something about the country which is 
constructive. But that was… I remember driving around as a teenager with a 
bike festooned with Union Jacks and red ensigns, when all the other bikes in 
my part of the city of Montreal were festooned with red maple leaves. 
 
SO: Were you ridiculed? 
 
HS: A little bit, but it was also a little bit that the old Anglo-Saxons in town didn't 
like the new flag, but the French Canadians and some of the new ethnic 
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groups who didn't have any prior association with the Crown – so, Greek 
Canadians, Portuguese Canadians and Italian Canadians, who are in some 
large numbers in Montreal – just liked the new flag. 
 
SO: Speaking of Canadian opposition to apartheid, Prime Minister Trudeau 
was one of the most outspoken critics of both apartheid in South Africa 
but also the white minority regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. Did you 
start to play a particular activist role within Canadian moves towards 
sanctions towards South Africa, [or] towards supporting black majority 
rule in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe before 1980, and then South Africa? 
 
HS: Yes. In the mid-70s, I was working as the Principal Secretary to the Premier 
of Ontario. So, Ontario is our largest province [and] the premier was a chap 
by the name of Bill Davis – very much a Red Tory Premier. He was in office 
for some sixteen years and was very popular. Ontario took positions in 
support of the federal sanctions because, in some cases, while the federal 
government can impose sanctions, the industries that were involved were 
regulated by the province under our constitution, Sections 91 and 92. So, 
Ontario had to do work in that respect, and that was one of the responsibilities 
which I had in the Premier's office: to make sure that our Department of 
Industry, our Department of Commercial Licensing and all the rest were fully 
engaged and supportive of the federal sanctions. 
 
So, I left Mr Davis in 1982. My wife and I had our first child, so I went into the 
private sector for a period of about ten years, but [remained] very much 
involved in the federal Conservative party [and] federal Conservative 
campaigns. I would have been one of those working on the polling and 
advertising side, [and] that underlined the point that when our Prime Minister 
– and now I'm talking about Brian Mulroney, in 1984 – took a position that 
was in opposition to Ronald Reagan or Mrs Thatcher but did so on something 
like apartheid, where he supported the Commonwealth and its sanctions 
against South Africa, his numbers… He would do it on a matter of principle – 
Prime Minister Mulroney was Irish, and very passionate about these 
questions – but his numbers amongst young people and women and French 
Canadians, his polling numbers, would go up, because the young people and 
women and French Canadians were never big fans of either Mrs Thatcher or 
of Mr Reagan. They viewed them as too ideological for the Canadian context. 
So, when Mulroney did the right thing on apartheid and was clearly divided 
from Mrs Thatcher and divided from Mr Reagan, that would produce 
substantial polling support amongst women, young people and French 
Canadians. 
 
SO: So, it was attractive to his domestic constituents. 
 
HS: Particularly in support of the municipal vote – the civic vote, the vote to the big 
urban municipal [institutions]. Tories [in Canada], not unlike in the United 
Kingdom, tend to do okay in the countryside most of the time, but in the big 
cities it's a battle. So, this was very, very helpful. 
 
SO: That sounds very familiar to the pattern of voting in the UK. 
 
HS: It was very helpful to him to take those positions, but he did them as a matter 
of principle. Then I had the chance…I went on his staff, laterally. As I said 
over lunch, Canada would not desist on sanctions until we heard from 
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Mandela – whatever the pressure from the Americans, the British or our own 
banks and mining companies. 
 
SO: Did you attend the CHOGM in Vancouver in 1987? 
 
HS: No, I did not. I didn't join the Prime Minister's staff until 1991, so I did not 
attend that meeting. I know of it, I remember the dynamic, I saw the coverage, 
but I wasn't part of it. 
 
SO: 1991, then, was after the release of Mandela, which was in February 
1990. South Africa was embarking upon the equally troubled and 
tortuous road to constitutional democracy and black majority rule. It 
seems to me that the Commonwealth's role in the run up to De Klerk's 
extraordinary announcement in his national assembly speech, and 
Mandela’s subsequent release, is much more covered and better known  
than the Commonwealth Secretariat's role and the role of individual 
Commonwealth countries from 1990 to 94. Would you agree with that? 
 
HS: Yes, I would, because a lot of what the Commonwealth did – kind of [like] 
what Canada did – was not part of the public record. The fact that Mulroney 
used our International Development Research Centre (IDRC), which is set up 
for the purpose of measuring what kinds of development projects work the 
best and how do Canadian development projects around the world succeed 
or fail and what we can learn from that… He really used that as an instrument 
by which to provide funding and support for parts of the Mandela cabinet, so 
they might have the training – three week courses at places like Harvard or 
Cambridge, red bricks for that matter – so they could get basic core skills 
either in terms of fiscal policy literacy, defence policy literacy, [and] 
international affairs. When the Prime Minister asked Mandela, “How can we 
help?”, he said, “You can help this way”, and Mulroney said, “Done.” And as 
recently as a year ago, Trevor Manuel came to Canada – he's now the 
Minister for Cabinet Affairs but he used to be the Minister of Finance [in South 
Africa] – and he told a story at a lunch in the presence of ministers and 
parliamentarians about how Mulroney had been helpful in the early days to 
Mandela through the IDRC, which was celebrating its fortieth birthday.  
 
So, I think Mulroney – being very pragmatic and having a strong personal 
relationship with Mandela – said, “Tell me what I can do to help, what really 
matters.” He told them, and we did it. And also, with respect to the pressure 
from Canadian mining and other companies to get out of the extraction 
sanctions, to put back in and invest, I remember his position having been, 
“We will do that when Mandela tells us [that] De Klerk has gone far enough, 
or that majority democracy changes [have] proceeded sufficiently. And until 
such time as that happens, we're not going to back down from any of our 
sanctions.” He was basically saying to the government, to the bureaucracy, to 
industry, “We don't make this decision in some capricious way because it's in 
our interests. We've stood with Mandela while he was in jail; we're going to 
stand with Mandela now.” They became very, very close, and, in fact… 
Mandela became close with Mulroney: they talked on a regular basis; he was 
made an honorary citizen of Canada; he was given an honorary Order of 
Canada, which was our equivalent of the OBE. He came to Canada – by this 
point, Jean Chrétien was Prime Minister – and filled one of the largest 
stadiums in Toronto with literally 60,000 people who came to see him, all of 
which was very, very validating for the Commonwealth connection, because it 
had been through the Commonwealth that Canada had acted. It had been 
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through the Commonwealth and the meeting you referenced, in Vancouver, 
where Canada had confronted the forces of complacency, I guess – or 
cynicism – and hung in there with the battle. I think Canada would have been 
of the view that we couldn't have done that without the Commonwealth – that 
Sonny Ramphal, the Front Line States, were all critical elements of our 
capacity to make that happen. And because of where the Americans were 
standing, there would have been no other foreign policy network through 
which we could have achieved that and been part of the team that stood with 
the Front Line States and really assisted the peaceful transition to majority 
democracy in what everybody feared was going to be a horrific bloodbath. 
 
SO: Absolutely. I remember the press reports very clearly, and there was 
effectively a civil war going on in KwaZulu Natal with the standoff 
between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Yes, very tense times 
indeed. As the Chief of Staff, did you yourself develop close relations 
with people around Mandela – the political advisors, bureaucrats or 
leading people within the ANC? 
 
HS: Not that I can recall. Mulroney would be on those phone calls largely himself 
and he would have had a sherpa [i.e. leaders’ personal representative] 
designated to that file. The sherpa would be appointed about a year before 
every Commonwealth meeting, and that would usually be a senior 
bureaucrat, a senior deputy minister or a senior ambassador or high 
commissioner who had either been in London or elsewhere, and I would have 
been aware of the traffic but I wouldn't have had a major role in that.  
 
SO: Okay, so, did you go to Harare in October 1991? 
 
HS: No, I did not, no. I had just joined the staff in August of 1991; I did not have a 
remit on foreign policy, so I would not have gone to Harare. I joined as a 
senior policy advisor in August of ‘91. I didn't become Chief of Staff until 
January of ‘92, and stayed until April of ‘93. 
 
SO: So, what were the specific areas on which you were giving Prime 
Minister Mulroney policy advice? 
 
HS: I was a senior policy advisor – don't forget my background from provincial 
government. We had a tough referendum coming [up] on the Charlottetown 
Accord – a constitutional issue with Quebec – so my remit would've been 
domestic politics and federal/provincial relations, which was a very big part of 
our government's survival mixture at that time. I would not have been on the 
front line of the foreign policy position; certainly not in those early months. 
 
SO: In between leaving the Prime Minister's office as Chief of Staff in 1993 
and then, when you were appointed to the Senate in 2005, did you 
develop particular Commonwealth interests or activities? 
 
HS: Two things. I would have been a member of the Royal Commonwealth 
Society and I would have attended their meetings on a pretty regular basis. I 
would have spoken to various meetings and Commonwealth Day dinners 
across the country over that period of ten years. Otherwise, I would have had 
no direct contact or relationship with the Commonwealth [and] certainly no 
contact with the bodies here, in London. That would not have been part of my 
day-to-day job. I was, in fact, an advertising executive in the private sector for 
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that period of time, and that would not have brought me into contact with 
Great Britain in any way, shape or form. 
 
SO: When were you appointed chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee? 
 
HS: I was appointed to the Senate in August of 2005. We did not form a 
government until September of 2006, and I was appointed chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee that fall because the government gets the right of 
appointment in a negotiation with the opposition parties. So, I then became 
chairman of that, and I served through until 2007. Our major effort at that time 
– which I think you referenced in your questions – was a major review of 
Canada's foreign aid, CIDA [Canadian International Development Agency], 
and we produced quite a difficult report in terms of talking about 
inconsistencies in CIDA's policy, a lack of value, undue bureaucracy in terms 
of how the services were delivered, the fact that – unlike DFID – ninety-five 
percent of our employees worked in Ottawa. Whereas DFID, AUSAID and 
USAID had a good chunk of their employees around the world in target 
countries, we did not. We talked about the amount of money going into Africa 
and the amount of money coming out of Africa through corruption. We dealt 
with some of the difficult issues. A lot of the government's policies towards 
CIDA have now changed – particularly as related to Africa – but that report 
was quite a…It was not without controversy, but it was a very salient report in 
terms of making foreign aid issues part and parcel of the dynamic. 
 
SO: As part and parcel of that critique, did you also pass comment on 
CIDA's contribution or the Canadian government's contribution to the 
funding of the Commonwealth Secretariat, and also the funding for 
technical development programmes via the Secretariat? 
 
HS: I don't believe we made a specific reference to ComSec. We talked about 
technical assistance per se, and we talked about the various… You know, 
Canada had a tendency of…Rather than funding a project on the ground, 
Sue, Canada would say, “Let's just write a cheque to the government of 
Uganda.” 
 
SO: Ah, so it was general budgetary assistance? 
 
HS: Right. The reason we would do that is because our Auditor General said [that] 
when we used to fund individual projects, sadly, some of those projects would 
fail. [On] some of the projects, we would see people stealing money. So, it 
became easier for our civil servants just to write a cheque to another 
government for a development project: get a receipt, and that's the end of the 
audit trail. But the fact that the government would then…God knows what 
they used the money for, or they would charge some kind of ‘pass through’ 
fee for the recipients, completely against Canadian policy. That didn't seem to 
bother us at all. So, we exposed some of those weaknesses in the report I 
chaired, and suggested that we have to take a much more granular approach 
on the ground to making sure projects were real. 
 
SO: So, unfortunately for your continued position as chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, you then stepped down. 
 
HS: Yeah, two things. Well, there's the official story and there's the truth. The 
official story is that my report was so controversial that they asked me to step 
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down. It is not remotely the truth. The truth is – no one's ever asked before, 
so thank you – the truth is that…It’s a little…I'll just take thirty seconds [to 
explain].  
 
We had a member of our Senate caucus by the name of Don Oliver – decent 
guy, happens to be a Caribbean Canadian, and he chaired the Justice 
Committee of the Senate. The government brought in new accountability 
legislation, dealing with previous Liberal [Party] so-called ‘scandals’: tougher 
spending rules, tougher expense rules, tougher disclosure rules for the 
government as a whole. Many of those pieces of legislation were rubbished in 
the Senate – the committee he was chairing – because he wasn't there and 
the opposition had a majority. He was travelling: he was an IPU person – 
Inter-Parliamentary Union – [and also] Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association, so he would miss a lot of meetings. When the Bill got beaten up 
so badly, the government decided to remove him as the chair of the Justice 
Committee. He was a senior Parliamentarian who had been in the Senate for 
fifteen years; I had just arrived. He went to our leader in the Senate and said 
– it happened to be March, which was Black History Month – he said, “Is it the 
Prime Minister's wish to turn me into history in Black History Month? Why 
does young Segal, who just got here, chair the most prestigious committee 
and why do I now have nothing?” Marjory LeBreton, the Government leader in 
the Senate, asked if I would step aside to facilitate him taking the 
chairmanship. I said it wouldn't be my first choice, but if that's the wish, I'm 
glad to do it. I said, “But understand, Marjory, [that] the other parties have a 
majority on this committee. When I joined the Senate, there were seventy 
Liberals and fifteen of us, so you have my support but you've got to get the 
Liberals on side.” They would not support Don Oliver, so we ended up with a 
Liberal chair and me no longer chair of the Committee.  
 
The Canadian media are so good at labelling. They say, “Well, this is 
because the government is a right-wing government and he's a Red Tory and 
they had to move him out.” I know it says that. It's just not the truth, but it 
doesn't actually pay to work hard to change it because it doesn't really matter, 
frankly. Aren't you glad you asked? 
 
SO: I am. I'm always fascinated by political manoeuvrings, which, in your 
case – and indeed your government's case – actually backfired in terms 
of maintaining the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. 
 
HS: Right. Yes, it worked out completely unconstructively and for no purpose, and 
Don Oliver didn't even get to be chair. So, the purpose of treating one of our 
visible minority people well didn't happen either. 
 
SO: No. So, lose-lose. You're currently chair of the Special Senate 
Committee on Anti-Terrorism. If I could just address this before we 
come back to contemporary Commonwealth issues… Has there been, in 
any way, a particular Commonwealth dimension to your work on anti-
terrorism? 
 
HS: There have been two parts to that. One is that, in the early days in that 
committee, I came to the UK to meet with security officials here, some of 
whom still can't be named – senior police officers and inspectors who were 
involved with anti-terrorism activities – and we even arranged for some of 
them to appear by teleconference as witnesses before our Senate committee 
on terrorism, so we could learn from aspects of the British experience: both in 
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terms of the management of home-grown terrorists amongst your own 
population, and with respect to the way in which anti-terrorist organisations 
gather intelligence and share information with one another. So, I came here, I 
had two or three working lunches with senior security officials, and then we 
sorted out who could actually appear on camera and talk about some of the 
issues we were addressing. Our agenda says it was about taking legislation 
which Mr Chrétien had passed after 9/11 to help the Americans feel more 
secure about their northern border. So, that legislation was passed with the 
perception that it had been made ‘Charter-proof’, which means that none of 
the provisions in the law would violate the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
As it turns out, it wasn't quite so, and they lost quite a few court cases. So, 
when that legislation lapsed five years after 2001 – which was 2006 – we had 
to begin to renew the legislation, but with changes that were the result of 
decisions made by the courts around civil liberties, habeas corpus and 
various other critical British principles. The British were very helpful to us in 
some of the changes they had made to their own legislation, and we learnt 
from some of them about [that]. So, that was one area of activity. The other 
area of activity which soon followed involved some leading academics who 
had done research on home-grown terrorism, the alienation that that 
produced, the ways in which to deal with young people who became adrift in 
societies that were isolated from the mainstream, the way in which terrorist 
information, bomb plans and other plans were transmitted, the importance of 
the web in that whole process and what organisations could do within the 
framework of the constitution about that. So, there was a lot of help from 
them. 
 
We also had a fair amount of help from India. We connected with and got 
advice from the Indians because they were facing different kinds of situations. 
But, remember, the largest terrorist event in Canada's history was the blowing 
up of an Air India aircraft that took off from Vancouver over the Irish Sea. The 
bombs [which caused] the death of three hundred Indo-Canadians and others 
were placed in the hold of the aircraft in baggage in Vancouver, and there'd 
been a horrific failure – not unlike 9/11 but smaller, because it was a smaller 
event – of different parts of our security apparatus who had pieces of the 
puzzle before it happened but were so jealous of their various silos and not 
communicating with each other sufficiently that any hope of preventing this 
from happening was lost in the shuffle. We had a full public enquiry on that, 
and our committee learned from that in terms of things that now exist in 
Canada, such as the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC), which 
pulls together – this is not dissimilar from a British process in place – that 
pulls together army, navy, air force, CSIS, RCMP, criminal intelligence, plus 
linkages to all our allies around the world in a real time update of pertinent 
terrorist information, travel information, data sets, risk assessments, so that 
we're on top of things in a way that's coordinated. That did not exist before 
the Air India attack. 
 
SO: Senator Segal, would you say that there is an unknown Commonwealth 
dimension to this? You emphasised the bilateral relationship between 
London and Ottawa when you were talking about coming here – linking 
up with academics, linking up particularly with… 
 
HS: I don't know that it would involve the Secretariat, no, but is there a process by 
which Commonwealth countries share information? Well, there is the so-
called Five Eyes alliance, and Australia, Canada, New Zealand, [and] Great 
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Britain would be four of the Five Eyes [the fifth being the United States]. 
That's about as Commonwealth as you can get. 
 
SO: I know the Americans, when they think about the Commonwealth, they 
think about the old Commonwealth and they think ‘Five Eyes’, as you 
say.  
 
HS: Right, but that has now been expanded to involve work with our friends in 
India; we work with our friends in Singapore, [and] we work with South Africa. 
Now, are we working with them because they are Commonwealth countries? 
No, we're working with them because we have information that is of value, 
that we can share with them and they can share with us. I think that's what's 
going on. I think it would be a bit of an overstatement to suggest that it's the 
Commonwealth frame that's driving that. I don't think that's the issue. 
 
SO: A Commonwealth tinge. [Laughter] 
 
HS: A bit of a tinge. And look, we've had Sir Malcolm Rifkind and his committee of 
parliamentarians on intelligence who have come forward and who've come to 
Canada and who have met with my committee, shared notes, met with some 
of our most secure operations so that they can benefit there. We are learning 
from their approach to restrained but coherent legislative oversight of the 
security services, which we don't have in any way as concretely as you do 
here. So, I think the benefits are free-flowing and ongoing. 
 
SO: Well, it's a little known aspect of inter-Commonwealth collaboration and 
support. It doesn't have formal structures and guidance channelled 
through ComSec at all. 
 
HS: No, there'd be no ComSec face on that at all. 
 
SO: So, before you were invited to join the Eminent Persons Group by 
Secretary General Sharma, had you already raised your profile on 
Commonwealth aspects? 
 
HS: I think, on Commonwealth Day 2009, I made a speech in Saskatchewan to 
the Commonwealth Society at their annual dinner, and it was a very 
aspirational speech about what the Commonwealth could become – what it 
could be – that was more than it was as we spoke. I think, somehow, that got 
circulated. I didn't [circulate it], but I think some people circulated it to 
ComSec and they circulated to other Commonwealth hands, so, when the 
government of Canada was asked to submit three names from which Sharma 
could choose an EPG member, mine was one of them. I must tell you, Sue, I 
don't know why. I was asked if I'd let my name stand and they said there'd be 
other names and we don't know how that will go. I said, “Sure, I'd be 
honoured to do that,” but I didn't think anything of it, frankly. I didn't think 
much would come of it, and I was stunned when I ended up getting a call from 
Sharma when he was in Ottawa, asking to come by for a cup of tea – which, I 
guess, was sort of a first-hand assessment of whether I was sufficiently 
'clubbable' to be on the EPG! I must say, I was quite relaxed about it until they 
came running over from Foreign Affairs to put a Commonwealth flag in my 
office because the Commonwealth Secretary General was coming to call on 
my office, which is quite a modest Senate office. It wouldn't be the most 
modest of Senate offices in Portcullis House or Lords' offices or Members' 
offices, but it's relatively modest! He came by and we had a wonderful cup of 
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tea and we talked about nothing in particular. Then, a few months later, I had 
a call asking if I would join the EPG. I think it was in June of 2010, and we 
had our first meetings in July, in fact.  
 
SO: What about the dynamics of that group? I know that the Commonwealth 
works by consensus, so I'm very well aware that your principal foci were 
a Charter [and] the Commissioner on Human Rights, which you were 
aware would be contentious… 
 
HS: The best way to describe the dynamics, Sue, would be [to say] that there are 
people who were for relatively radical reform – like Michael Kirby, whom we 
all adored and who had a very jurisprudential sense of what was necessary 
and required, and who was very strong on a range of human rights, not 
excluding gay rights – and then there'd be people like Sir Ronald Sanders, 
who had this long, ongoing tactile relationship with the Commonwealth that 
went all the way back to Sonny Ramphal, all the way back to his days as High 
Commissioner and chairing the sanctions committee during the apartheid 
proposition. Then you'd have someone like Tun Abdullah Badawi, who was a 
former Prime Minister from Malaysia, who I suspect the staff at the 
headquarters figured could be relatively easily guided and managed. They 
were deeply wrong about that. 
 
SO: That was a miscalculation, since he was the chair! 
 
HS: But I think they suggested him as the chair, so that the process could be more 
easily managed. Then they had… By the way, [it] ended up being [that] he 
wasn't at all easily managed: he became quite a vociferous defender of our 
independence as a group. Asma Jahangir from Pakistan, a feisty, articulate 
human rights advocate. We could all talk about human rights; she would have 
been to prison three or four times in defence of human rights, so that made 
the discussion a little bit less theoretical, a bit more practical. Emmanuel 
Akwetey, this tall, stunningly articulate head of the Institute of Democratic 
Governance in Ghana. The woman from Jamaica, Patricia Francis, who 
headed the International Trade Council: also a person who was given to 
being pretty forceful and articulate. Sammy Kavuma,of Uganda: a young, 
determined advocate for young people's interests and rights and freedoms in 
the process. So, it was quite a good group and we gelled remarkably well – 
surprisingly so – early on, and partially because we felt the Secretariat was 
trying to manage and direct the process in a very polite way. We benefitted 
immensely from Daisy Cooper, who was the sort of executive secretary of our 
operation: putting the meetings together and making them happen; doing the 
research in between; helping to draft the press releases after every meeting. 
Deciding to have a press release after every meeting was something the 
Secretariat did not like. They wanted the EPG to do the work, but they didn't 
want the EPG to develop its own identity in the mix of the broader world. It 
became… We began to argue that we would do our own press releases, we 
would keep our own minutes, we would determine our own agenda, [and] in 
the end we would write our own report. We wouldn't have a draft handed to 
us by the Secretariat, and we were all together on that. There wasn't any 
slippage in the process between all of us who served on the EPG. My sense 
is that Kamalesh Sharma, who first thought we might be manageable, 
realised that that wasn't on, and then tried to address the new reality, which 
was [that] this committee was going to head in its own direction, do its own 
thing, make its own choices and its own recommendations. I'm not sure all his 
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staff accepted that quite as comfortably, but he did, and that made it easier 
for us to manoeuvre, quite frankly.  
 
SO: Yes. Well, why was there the delay in publication? I know that that, in 
itself, is a separate chapter in the political story of the EPG. 
 
HS: I would say there was the official story and then I'll give you my honest view 
as to what really happened. The official story is that, when we submitted the 
document, which was end of July…And let me tell you how I know that. 
Rosemarie Brisson [PA to Hugh Segal] – who's here with me and has been 
on this file from the very beginning – she and Sir Ronald Sanders were 
charged by the rest of us to do the final edited version. We did not want it 
done in the Secretariat. So, in fact, Jim Wright in the Canadian High 
Commission [in London] stepped forward, and the actual three or four days of 
final editing took place in the Canadian High Commission at Grosvenor 
Square, with Sir Ronald holding the pen and Rose doing the research and the 
patching and the filling and the pasting which is necessary in that process. It 
was then submitted [at the] end of July. We were not of the view that it had to 
be printed; they said it had to be printed. I think two weeks later [Sir Ronald] 
looked at the proofs. By this point, we are in the second week of August: 
there was no reason for it not to be distributed then. Then, from out of 
nowhere comes this notion that the Chairperson-in-Office – Kamla Persad, 
the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago – and the incoming Chairperson-
in-Office had decided the report couldn't be distributed yet because it hadn't 
been read by heads and by foreign ministers. 
 
SO: Okay, that's a bit different from the path of the EPG report in 1986. 
 
HS: Big time. Huge! So, that's when the light went on that, okay, someone is 
trying to manage this. Our determination, essentially, was [that] the 
Secretariat thought too many of the ideas were too bolshie and too radical, 
[and] that they didn't want any public constituency built for those ideas before 
the [heads of government] meeting at Perth. In September, it finally got 
distributed in text form – about two weeks before the foreign ministers' 
meeting in September. I was the designated hitter for the EPG to be at the 
front desk – the front table, the high table – to answer questions from the fifty-
four foreign ministers in the room, at the UN. There were very few substantive 
questions. They were all someone like the foreign minister of Botswana 
saying, “So, how can we approve this? We just got this a few days ago.” 
Right? “Well, we'd actually finished it a month and a half ago.” So, to be fair to 
Kevin Rudd, Rudd said, “Please be assured that when we get to Perth, I'll 
make sure that foreign ministers have a good two days to work through this 
report. So, you don't have to hold it up now because you just got it.” Had he 
not said that, the report could have been shelved even as we speak – even at 
that meeting in the UN – because that's where the mood of the room was 
going. A few ministers like Lord Howell, our own minister John Baird, Rudd, 
Malta, Mauritius, [and] Barbados spoke in favour of moving ahead with it, but 
a whole lot of others spoke in favour of stopping it because they hadn't had a 
chance to read it. I think part of what often happens when a bureaucracy 
doesn't want change is they manage the document so that the people who 
can actually authorise the change don't get the document early enough to be 
able to come to a rational decision upon it. 
 
SO: That's controlling information with a vengeance. 
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HS: Yes. So, we knew right then and there that we had a core problem. I then 
went – it was before that meeting, in August – I went with Sir Ronald to 
Trinidad to have a forum on the Eminent Persons Group report. Part of what 
we had agreed to do was [that] we would travel around the world, to different 
parts of the world, [and] have public meetings and/or [meetings] with 
legislatures about the principles in the EPG report, get their response and 
then do the final draft based on the consultation. So, Sir Ronald and I were 
designated the Caribbean and we went to Trinidad. We spoke at a forum, we 
did media, we spoke at a university, we spent time with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. And then to find out that Persad, the Prime Minister – who 
didn't see us because she said she had dengue fever – had ordered that this 
not be made public, and that Julia Gillard had said she would not disagree 
with that so as to keep peace in the family. We were going to be heading into 
a meeting in October without the actual report being public, [and that] simply 
infuriated us. 
 
SO: How do you account for Persad's resistance? 
 
HS: I think she got called by the Secretariat and told what to say. I don't think you 
can have a view in the world on it. Not a view in the world. And Gillard, I think, 
was just looking not to have a shootout with Persad, as the host of the coming 
meeting. So, that produced this remarkable press conference in Perth on the 
Friday. The meeting opened in the morning. The foreign ministers had been 
terrible about the report – tearing it apart on Thursday, except for the CMAG 
changes, because that was foreign minister-recommended. Then we were 
really saved by Her Majesty, who, in her opening comments, said something 
to the effect that she had read the EPG report, found it to be a remarkable 
and encouraging document and looked forward very much to hearing from 
her first ministers what progress had been made on its important and helpful 
recommendations. What do you think of that? That's what she did. No, she 
was great. 
 
SO: A very timely intervention by Her Majesty, registering her concern and 
interest. 
 
HS: Yes. That meant that the first ministers, when they met, tried to slough this 
off, but there was now a cadre who said, “Look, Her Majesty said something 
very important.” And, in fact, on that Friday, they worked through [the 
document] all day. Then, on the Saturday, the Prime Minister – my Prime 
Minister, who was supposed to leave at noon because our aircraft requires 
stopping at a little French atoll somewhere in the Pacific to refuel – he stayed 
four hours longer because there wasn't sufficient progress on the document. 
He got it to the point where there were thirty approved out of one hundred and 
six recommendations: thirty approved outright, forty approved in principle 
pending further analysis, another 40 approved pending financial analysis. But 
it began to be a more positive picture than would have been had Her Majesty 
not said what she said and had our Prime Minister and the Australian Prime 
Minister and some others engaged to move the ball ahead. 
 
SO: So, a political attempt to kick it into the long grass was effectively 
thwarted. 
  
HS: Yes. In my speeches back home and my reports back after Perth, I said we 
have to form lawnmower committees across the Commonwealth to keep the 
long grass from subsuming this document so it's never seen again. Then, of 
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course, I was dispatched by my government to actually make the case in 
various places. So, in the EPG principles process I went to the Caribbean and 
I went to South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya, and then in the post-Perth 
process, to advance the progress of the document through further stages, I 
went to Bangladesh, Malaysia, Singapore and Malta. All for particular reasons 
in terms of their areas of influence. 
 
SO: So, if I could just ask you a wrap-up question, because I'm very 
conscious of your next appointment. In your time since acting as Chief 
of Staff for Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in the early 1990s to here, in 
2013, has there been a consistent Canadian attitude of engagement and 
involvement in the Commonwealth? Or has it ebbed and flowed? 
 
HS: It ebbed during the Chrétien period. As I mentioned at lunch, Chrétien was 
caught up with La Francophonie; he was [also] caught up with the Tony Blair-
driven Third Way, as you may recall. He was caught up with the further 
negotiations of NAFTA with the Americans, and those were just more 
important. He didn't have a view of foreign policy as an instrument for global 
values, or [for] the promotion of Canadian values. He had a view of foreign 
policy as an instrument through which he would advance commercial values. 
So, he had a series of trade missions – Team Canada trade missions – 
around the world, but they were rarely about politics. They were always just 
about trade and commerce and I think his view was that Mulroney on free 
trade, on tax reform, on apartheid, on the Middle East and a whole bunch of 
other areas had been far too aspirational and far too ambitious. Mulroney 
would say, “Well, that's the difference between a Tory and a Liberal on these 
sorts of issues.” So, we did go through a period of some somnolence on the 
matter, where Canada's participation was at best limited and perfunctory and 
in some cases, I think, profoundly unhelpful. 
 
SO: Senator, I'm going to stop there. Thank you very much indeed and I look 
forward to talking to you again in future. 
 
HS: I'll make sure if you're ever coming in our direction, we can chat again. 
 
 
 [END OF AUDIOFILE PART ONE] 
 
 
